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RECENT DECISIONS
an intolerable burden would be placed on governmental units if they
were bound by the doctrine of estoppel in their multiplicity of func-
tions, causing the resulting depletion of public funds.
It must be noted, however, that a contradiction of this trend came
forth from the Wisconsin court not long ago. In Holytz v. City of Mil-
waukee,'7 the court swept away all remaining vestiges of governmental
immunity, exposing governments as a result, to suit in the operation of
governmental as well as proprietary powers, thus expanding govern-
mental liability for acts of its agents. On the other hand, Justice Currie's
view would decrease responsibility by not allowing estoppel for acts
done in pursuit of governmental functions, thus lessening governmental
jeopardy to suit. Although the Holytz case reflects the growing tendency
to treat governments the same as individuals before the law, Justice
Currie's concurring opinion if properly interpreted by this note, marks
a change in this trend.
The above analysis of the concurring opinion of the Schober case
points out the hopeless confusion on the holdings as to whether estoppel
applies to the taxation and zoning functions of government, or as to
what test is to be applied to determine if the facts in a particular case
warrant applicability. The concurring opinion does not serve to clear up
the confusion.
S[ERIN SHAPIRO
Search and Seizure: Mapp v. Ohio, Prospective or Retro-
spective-A 66 year old woman was found gagged, bound and
stabbed to death in her tavern-residence. A cigar box containing cash,
a safe deposit box key, and other keys with a metal tag bearing her
husband's name were missing. The defendant was picked up for ques-
tioning, and later he guided the police officers to his hotel, telling the
officers his room number. The defendant waited outside, knowing that
the officers were searching his room. The search, which was conducted
without a warrant, produced the missing cigar box, cash, and keys.
When informed of the discovery, the defendant admitted robbing the
tavern, carrying a loaded gun and binding and gagging the victim, al-
though he could not recall stabbing her.
He was tried, convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced
to death. At his trial, he made no objection when the articles discovered
during the search of his hotel room were offered and admitted into
evidence. All his state remedies were denied' as was his application for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.2
17 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
'Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (1960), 224 Md. 662, 168 A2d 373(1961).
2 Hall v. State, 368 U.S. 867 (1961).
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At the time of the trial and appeals, Maryland courts had adopted
a modified version of the rule in Wolf v. Colorado,3 sanctioning the
admission into evidence in felony cases of material seized by state offi-
cers in an unlawful search. But, within one year after defendant's ap-
peals had been denied, the United States Supreme Court overruled the
decision in Wolf v. Colorado,4 and held that the federal exclusionary
doctrine as set forth in Weeks v. United States5 was applicable in state
as well as federal prosecutions. 6
After the Mapp decision, the defendant filed a petition of habeas
corpus in the Federal District Court. The District Court denied the
petition,7 but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, on the basis that
since the officers had conducted an illegal search, the admision into evi-
dence of the fruits of the search was prejudicial error.8 Thus, the rule
set forth in Mapp v. Ohio9 was applied retrospectively.'0
The significance of this decision can be seen in the fact that prior to
the Mapp decision, approximately one-half of the states allowed the
admission of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. If the
Mapp doctrine applies to all prior cases where illegally obtained evi-
dence was used, all these individuals would have a right to a new trial.
The initial inquiry is whether declarations of law by the Supreme
Court can be limited to only prospective application. The traditional
theory has been that judges do not make law, but only discover it.
3338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4Ibid.
5 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 "... Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door re-
maining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, in-
admissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654, 655 (1961).
"... Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to
all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically
and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part
of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of
the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its
most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment .... " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 656 (1961).
7Hall v. Warden, 201 F.Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1962).
SHall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963). The State of Maryland has
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States.
9 Supra note 6.10 See Gaitan v. United States, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1963) where the court
applied the Mapp rule prospectively in deciding that a pre-Mapp connection
based on illegally seized evidence need not be vacated.
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For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly ab-
surd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad
law; but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established
custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.1'
A strict application of this theory indicates that since the prior law
never was a law, when a prior decision is overruled, the new law must
operate retrospectively. The Supreme Court has never directly decided
whether or not it is bound to apply a new overruling decision retrospec-
tively, although in Chicot County Drainage District s. Baxter State
Bank there is strong dictum that in declaring a statute unconstitutional
the decision may be applied prospectively only.' 2 Numerous lower court
decisions have also been limited to prospective operation.' 3
This writer feels it is a more realistic approach to decide whether a
decision should be applied retrospectively or prospectively on the merits
of each case.
Though the Supreme Court did not explicitly state whether the
Mapp decision was to apply either retrospectively or prospectively,
some of the language used could be interpreted as showing an intent
to apply the new rule retrospectively. The Court speaking through jus-
tice Clark said:
There are those who say, as did justice (then judge) Car-
dozo, that under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine '[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered'. Peo-
ple v. Defore, 242 N.Y., at 21, 150 N.E. at 587. In some cases
this will undoubtedly be the result.' 4
111 BLACKSTONE, ComENTARIEs 69 (Cooley ed. 1884).
12308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). "The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S.
559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect
of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an opera-
tive fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, -with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
'13Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
678 (1941). Also see Durham v. United States, 214 F2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
footnote 46 for a list of citations in support of the courts power to apply
a decision prospectively.
'1 Supra note 6, at 659.
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The Court then made a footnote reference to Griffin v. Illinois,15 and
said the. class of state convictions possibly affected by the Mapp deci-
sion would be of relatively narrow compass when compared with Grif-
fin. In the Griffin case, the Supreme Court held that an indigent had a
right to be furnished a free transcript of his trial, when a transcript
was necessary for an appeal. And in a later case the Court held that the
Griffin doctrine was retrospective.16 Thus, it could be implied that the
Court felt Mapp should be retrospective since Griffin, which concerned
a greater magnitude of cases, was held to be retrospective.
Additionally, it appears that Justice Harlan in his dissent considered
the Mapp decision to be retrospective since he said that the number of
appeals which have appeared before the Supreme Court concerning the
admissability of illegally obtained state evidence ". . . would indicate
both that the issue which is now being decided may well have untoward
practical ramifications respecting state cases long since disposed of in
reliance on Wolf.... 17
Though the language used in Mapp does tend to indicate that the
decision will be applied retrospectively, this writer feels the language
is not so strong as to preclude a contrary finding. Therefore, the ques-
tion of applying the Mapp decision retrospectively or prospectively is
still open to discussion on its merits.
On the fact, it appears all the equities are in favor of applying the
rule retrospectively. For, simply stated, why would a conviction stand
when the same person could not be convicted now on the same evi-
dence. 18 Moreover, applying the doctrine retrospectively doesn't auto-
matically free the individual from prison, since it merely requires a
new trial. Yet, the purpose of this exclusionary doctrine should not be
forgotten. It isn't solely to prevent the conviction of the innocent, but
rather to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement as well.
Yet however, felicitous their phrasing, these objections hardly
answer the basic postulate of the exclusionary rule itself. The
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter
-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregardit.19
That the purpose of the exclusionary doctrine differs from the retro-
spective rule of the Griffin case can be readily seen. In the Griffin case
the individual was being deprived of his right to appeal, i.e., the right
15351 U.S. 12 (1955).
26Eskridge v. Washingtori State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357
U.S. 214 (1957).
17 Supra note 6, at 676.
18 See 36 WASH. L. REv. 407, 431-433 (1961) where the author feels that since
Mapp is a constitutional interpretation, there cannot be two constitutional
standards; one before and one after Mapp.
19 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1959).
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to have a higher court decide whether prejudicial error precluded him
from having a fair trial, with the possible result of a conviction of an
innocent person. But, under the Mapp rule, probative evidence is being
withheld for the primary purpose of deterring illegal searches.2 0 The
guilt of the individual is not in issue. And, though it does not necessarily
follow that the individual will be released from prison since he will
only be given a new trial, practically it would be impossible to litigate
the facts behind the obtaining of evidence in cases long concluded. 21
it is this writer's opinion that in deciding whether the Mapp deci-
sion should be given the retrospective operation, the court should weigh
the individual's interest against the purpose of the exclusionary doc-
trine and the efficient administration of justice.
Ancillary to the main issue of whether the Mapp decision should be
applied retrospectively is the issue of whether Hall's failure to make a
timely objection to the proffered evidence obtained from the illegal
search precludes him from raising it on this appeal. The general rule
was well stated in Whitney v. Steiner:
Whatever the theoretical basis, however, the Supreme Court
has explicitly held that where a state prisoner, asserting a denial
of constitutional rights in connection with his conviction, has a
remedy in the state court but fails to avail himself of it, and later
finds himself without a state remedy, he may not have redress
through federal habeas corpus.... Under such circumstances the
petitioner has . . . 'forfeited his constitutional claim.'2
2
The court did recognize a number of exceptions to this rule though,
including cases where the petitioner can present other strong reasons
justifying his failure, or cases where particular circumstances exist
which are deemed to justify federal action. It is suggested that the par-
ticular circumstances in the instant case do justify overlooking the
failure to object to the evidence offered. The Supreme Court had for
many years steadfastly refused to require the states to adopt the Weeks
exclusionary doctrine, nor did its decisions suggest that they would
change the rule. It may have been wiser to object to the introduction
of the evidence as was done in the Mapp case, but it seems ". . . under
these special circumstances, the failure of Hall to object to the admis-
sion of the fruits of the illegal search and to raise the question on appeal
is not only understandable but excusable."23
PETER J. LETTENBERGER
20 It could be argued that this purpose would best be served by applying the
decision retrospectively since this would immediately demonstrate to law
officers the effect of illegal searches and seizures.
21 The Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that even Hall's confession may be
inadmissible since it was given immediately after Hall was told of the re-
sult of the search.
22 293 F.2d 895, 898, 899 (4th Cir. 1961).
23 Supra note 8, at 30.

